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The Supreme Court and the
Advisory Opinion
F. R. AuMANN*
The task of courts applying law in the "great society" is
never an easy one. At all times they must harmonize the claims
of stability with those of progress; the claims of liberty with
those of equality, and both of them with order. Compelled to
preserve to justice its universal quality, they must nevertheless
leave to it the capacity to be individual and particular. Attempt-
ing to reconcile the irreconcilable they encounter difficulty in
periods when social patterns are relatively fixed in character.'
Increasingly difficult is their problem in times of marked social
change,2 and in a political environment in which confidence is
placed in written constitutions;' "parchment barriers";' checks
and balances;5 separation of powers;6 the idea of a government
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.
1 Benjamin Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Sciences, pp. 4-5.
"The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of the antithesis,
the synthesis of the opposites, these are the great problems of the law. 'Nomos,'
one might fairly say, is the child of the antinomies, and is born of them in
travail. We fancy ourselves to be dealing with some ultra-modern controversy,
the product of the dash of interest in an industrial society. The problem is
laid bare, and at its core are the ancient mysteries crying out for understanding
-rest and motion, the one and the many, the self and the not self, freedom
and necessity, reality and appearance, the absolute and the relative." Cardozo,
Paradoxes of Legal Science, (19z8), pp. 4-5.
2 Sir Frederick Pollock, The Expansion of the Commo= Law (1904), pp.
107-I38.
' Forrest R. Black, "Constitution and Democracy," Annals of the Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 169, Sept., 1933, pp. I-1 I.
4 Forrest R. Black, The American Constitutional System-An Experiment
in Limited Government, Z4 Ken. L. J. 24 (1935).
r John Adams discovered no less than eight different kinds of balances in
our system. Ibid, p. 17.
6 Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13-14 Col. L. Rev. 696-75 3;
see also R. H. Jackson, An Organized American Bar, American Bar Association
Journal, June, 1932, Vol. I8, p. 384-
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of law as opposed to a government of men; 7 and the idea of a
mechanical application of a law as opposed to free legal decision.8
Today we are experiencing a period of rapid social change.
New conditions of life brought about by the technological ad-
vance compel social adjustments along a broad front.9 As the
courts essay the difficult task of infusing new social ideas into
the body of existing legal material, they inevitably encounter
a degree of discontent with their efforts."0 In some instances
dissatisfaction takes the form of mild derision; in other cases it
verges on open hostility. It may come from the left or the
right. It may emanate from the socially-minded individual who
is disappointed with the law's lag and holds the court's respon-
sible or from a bitterly critical interest group whose vested
interests have been interfered with. In all events the results
are the same. The courts become the storm-center of demands
for a change." The revisions suggested take various forms.
Some would modify this practice; others would alter that pro-
cedurei while still others would eliminate altogether the exist-,
ing powers of the court.
7 justice H. H. Lurton, Government 6f Law or a Government of Men,
North American Review, Jan., 1911 ; Louis Boudin, Government by Judici-
ary, Vol. Z, pp. 531-551, (1932); Howard L. McBain, The Living Consti-
tution, pp. 1-5; Edward S. Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court
(934), PP. 10Z-148.
' See Charles G. Haines, The American Doctrines of Judicial Supremacy,
(2nd Edition), (1932), pp. 500-510.
' Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, pp. 6-7.
'
0 F. R. Aumann, Public Opinion and the Legal Technique, 49 U. S.
Law Review (No. 2) 71-90 (1935).
11 This may be a very wholesome tendency. "It is a mistake to suppose,"
said Justice David J. Brewer, in his speech on "Government by Injunction,"
on Lincoln's birthday in 1898, "that the Supreme Court is either honored or
helped by being spoken of as beyond criticism. On the contrary, the life and
character of its judges should be the object of constant watchfulness by all, and
its judgments subject to the freest criticism. The time is past in the history of
the world when any living man or body of men can be set up on a pedestal
and decorated with a halo. True, many criticisms may be like their authors,
devoid of taste, but better all sorts of criticism than no criticism at all. The
moving waters are full of life and health; only in the stagnant waters is stag-
nation and death." Quoted by Silas Bent in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
pp. 8-1o.
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A reflection of this tendency can be seen in the national
government. In recent months the Supreme Court has become
the center of renewed interest. On numerous occasions sug-
gestions have been made that we subject the work and authority
of that body to a re-evaluation, particularly with regards to its
power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. 2 The griev-
ances uttered are not new.13 They have appeared on frequent
occasions in the past, and usually include a proposal to require a
vote of seven of the nine judges to hold an act of Congress
invalid 14 a proposal to increase the number of justices; a pro-
posal to curb the power of the court by abolishing its right to
receive cases on appeal from the lower courts; a proposal that
the court upon request by the legislature or executive be re-
quired to give its opinion as to the constitutionality of any pro-
posed measure or actions submitted to them.
12 "What to do with the Supreme Court?" A discussion by Morris R.
Cohen, Louis A. Boudin, and Osmond K. Frankel. The Nation, June io,
1935, pp. 39-43; Paul Blanchard, "Shall We Scrap the Constitution?", The
Forum, August, 1935, Vol. XCIV, pp. 69-73; Glenn Frank, "Shall We Keep
the Constitution?", The Forum, Aug., 1935, Vol. XCIV, pp. 69-73; Thomas
Reed Powell, "Recovery and the Supreme Court," Today, Nov. i8, 1933, PP-
3-4, 34-35; Leo Haberman and M. Wieting, "Supreme Court and Constitu-
tion," Scholastic, Sept. z8, x935; C. A. Beard, "Social Changes vs. Constitu-
tion," Current History, July, 1935; Edward S. Corwin, The Twilight of the
Supreme Court, Yale University Press (1934); "What is the Constitution?",
World Tomorrow, Sept. 14, 1933; "The Battle Lines of 1936," Colliers
Veekly, Feb. 17, 1934, p. 54; Max Lerner, "John Marshall's Long Shadow,"
New Republic, Sept. 8, 1935; Howard L. McBain, "The Constitution and
the New Deal," Yale Review, Sept., 1935; Thomas R. Powell, "The Consti-
tution and Social Security," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Sept., 1935; Walter M. Whittlesey, "Back of the Confedera-
tion," Survey Graphic, July, 1935; Hugh S. Johnson, "Playing with Dyna-
mite," American Magazine, Sept., 1935; A. H. Dixon, "Constitution and
Congress," National Republic, Oct., 1935; D. W. Brogan, "The American
Constitutional Crisis," Fortnightly, July 1935; Edwin F. Blair, "Has the
Supreme Court Doomed the New Deal?", Fortune, Sept., 1935"
'3 F. R. Aumann, The American Doctrines of Judicial Review, 2o Ken.L. J. 2.76, 303 (193z).
14 It is interesting to note that a national poll was conducted by the Amer-
ican Institute of Public Opinion in August, 1935, on the question "Do you
favor curbing the powers of the Supreme Court?" Incidentally 59% of those
voting opposed curbing the Court's power. A differently worded poll con-
ducted somewhat later by the same body indicated that 53% of those voting
opposed curbing the Court's power. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 3, 1935-
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The proposal concerning advisory opinions with which we
are especially concerned here, has several interesting aspects.
In the first place the "advisory opinion," so-called, has been
widely used in one form or another both here and in England;
and secondly, it has commanded some very respectable support
over a long period of time. Among others who have advocated
its adoption in recent years are: A. R. Ellingwood,"5 W. F.
Willoughby,"6 Manley 0. Hudson," Clarence W. Updegraff,8
James M. Beck, 9 Heywood Broun,2" and Governor Harold
Hoffman of New Jersey.2 Today it is receiving a widespread
public attention as the constitutionality of many New Deal
measures becomes a question of serious moment; and criticism
has been directed at the soundness of a governmental practice
which permits so much time to elapse between the passage of
an act of Congress and the date of its final passage."
"A. R. Ellingwood, Departmental Cooperation in State Goverment,
(1929). This book by a leading authority on the subject is a very thorough
study of the law and practice of advisory opinions.
16 W. F. Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Administration, (1929) pp.
85-88.
17 Manley 0. Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and International
Courts, 37 Harv. L. R. 971-1001 (923).
18 Clarence W. Updegraff and Paul C. Clovis, Advisory Opinions, 13
Iowa L. R. 188 (I9z8).
16 Mr. Beck in an address delivered at the annual dinner of the Pennsyl-
vania Society of New York on Dec. 20, 1924, recommended that the possibil-
ities of "advisory opinions" by the Supreme Court be given careful considera-
tion. He seemed to think the practice would serve a very useful purpose. See
New York Times, Dec. 2I, 1924.
2 Heywood Broun, "It Seems to Me," The Columbus Citizen, Jan. 23,
1935.
21 "A Specious Short Cut," The Saturday Evening Post, Jan. II, 1936,
p. 26.
2 "For better or worse," writes one newspaper commentator who has a
large syndicate following, "our economic system is a very complicated one.
Any measures which vitally affect money rock the whole structure. Sometimes
months or even years elapse before the gears and flywheels have been read-
justed to the new rhythm. And at this exact point up steps some litigant with
an appeal to the Supreme Court and again there is fear of earthquakes.
"Even in such instances as an established policy is upheld there are long
periods of doubt and uncertainty. If the Court is going to speak forever with
the authority which it now possesses, it should at the very least, be obligated,
to make its voice known at the time of the controversy, or forever after hold
its peace." Heywood Broun, The Columbus Citizen, Jan. 23, 1935.
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With dozens of laws before the Court and the interests of
millions of people involved the time element becomes a matter
of the greatest importance.23 Thousands of miners watched with
anxious care while the constitutionality of the Guffey bill re-
mained unsettled; thousands of farmers were equally disturbed
while the legal status of the Agricultural Adjustment Act re-
mained in doubt; just as thousands of utility investors awaited
the Court's decision on the holding company bill; and thousands
of railroad workers awaited the outcome of the railroad pension
bill. When hopes have been raised for great masses of people
only to be dashed to the ground by a judicial veto, dissatisfaction
is bound to arise; or if people are compelled to live in fear and
uncertainty over a large period until the Court speaks, the result
will be the same.
The time factor which troubles Mr. Heywood Broun, who
speaks from one point of view, likewise disturbs Mr. James W.
Beck, who speaks from quite another. Indeed, it is this matter
more than anything else which causes him to support the advis-
ory opinion. An ardent defender of the Constitution and the
Supreme Court, he believes it highly important to strengthen
public confidence in that body. The Supreme Court, he points
out, has been the object of continuous attack from the beginning
of the Republic, largely due to "the present exclusive method of
deciding constitutional issues, whereby after a law has been
enacted and acquiesced in, it is subsequently nullified, generally
in the course of private litigation." 4 He cites the history of the
Missouri Compromise, the Commodities Law, and the Insular
Cases, in support of his contention.
The Missouri Compromise, it will be remembered, was
effected in 1820, when Congress passed a law limiting slavery
to certain portions of the Territories. It was acquiesced in by
both political parties and was looked upon as a wise solution of
The Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 3, 1935-2 4 James M. Beck, "The Constitution and the Supreme Court," The
Law Student, Vol. z, Feb. 15, 1924, p. I ; The Future of the Supreme Court,
P. 7-
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a difficult problem. In 1857, in the Dred Scott Case, the Mis-
souri Compromise was nullified by the Supreme Court. The
voiding of this law was the signal for a bitter attack upon the
Supreme Court. The effects of this unpopular decision were
apparent for many a day.25 The time factor in this case, the
thirty-seven years involved, was responsible, in large part for
this popular dissatisfaction.
The Commodities Law referred to, is the Hepburn Act
enacted in 19o6. This act forbids railroads to transport in inter-
state commerce commodities other than timber and its manu-
factures which they own in part or in whole, or in which they
have an interest, direct or indirect, except when such commodi-
ties are needed and intended for their own use on common
carriers. These provisions were subsequently upheld by the
Supreme Court.26 During the interval existing between the
passage of the Act and the court's determination of its constitu-
tional status, Mr. Wickersham, the Attorney General, assumed
the power of suspending the law until the Supreme Court had
acted.
But suppose says Mr. Beck, that "fearful that its validity
might be sustained, the railroads had sold the mines at a loss
of a thousand million dollars, and then ten years later, in a case
between John- Doe and Richard Doe the Supreme Court had
decided the law was invalid. How could the railroads obtain
any reparation for gigantic losses which they had needlessly
sustained." This circumstance did not take place., "But for a
year," Mr. Beck solicitously remarks, "its possibility hung as a
heavy cloud over the business interests of the country and
probably many timid investors parted with their securities to
25 For an interesting discussion of the Dred Scott case, see Louis A. Bou-
din, Government by Judiciary, Vol. 2, pp. 1-3 1.
26 U. S. v. Delaware and Hudsonw Co., 213 U.S. 366; U. S. v. Lehigh
Valley Railroad Co., 220 U.S. 257; D. S. and W. R. Co. V. U. S., 231 U.S.
363; U. S. v. D. L. and W. R. Co., 238 U.S. 516; U. S. v. Reading Co.,
253 U.S. z6,
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their irreparable loss."27 Once again he stresses the importance
of the time factor.
The Insular Cases referred to were brought before the Su-
preme Court in I9o I.2 The problem here was to try to define
the relations between the United States and the outlying terri-
tories acquired by the United States as a result of the war with
Spain. Whether the constitution followed the flag was the ques-
tion of the day. The question was brought to decision when
certain importers resisted the collection of import duties on
articles of merchandise coming from Porto Rico. For some
time after Porto Rico had been officially ceded to the United
States the government continued to collect duties on imports
from the newly acquired territory, under the provisions of the
Dingley Tariff Act, on the theory that it remained a foreign
territory. In 19oo Congress passed the Foraker Act establish-
ing a government for the island, and a schedule of duties differ-
ent than those payable under the Dingley Tariff Act.
In 1 9oI the Supreme Court decided that after the cession of
Porto Rico to the United States by Spain, the island ceased to
be a "foreign country" and the Dingley Tariff Act was accord-
ingly inoperative. Duties collected by the United States upon
imports from Porto Rico after cession took place were therefore
illegal exactions and must be returned. In a second case the
Supreme Court held that although Porto Rico ceased to be a
"foreign country," it did not thereby become a part of the
United States within the meaning of the revenue provision of
the Constitution. In consequence, Congress was free to lay
duties upon the importations from Porto Rico at such rates as
it might deem proper.
"James M. Beck, the Future of the Supreme Court, p. 9. (Address
delivered before the Pennsylvania Society of New York, Dec. 2o, 1924).
28 The two more important of these cases were De Lima v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. i (igoI), and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (i9oI), dealing
respectively with the questions: I. Whether articles imported from Porto
Rico before the passage of the Foraker Act were subject to duties under the
Dingley Tariff Act; and 2. Whether the provisions of the Foraker Act
imposing duties upon such imports were constitutional. See Boudin, Govern-
ment by Judiciary, Vol. 2, pp. z61 ff.
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While these decisions were pending hundreds of millions
of dollars worth of merchandise were imported into the country
while doubt and hesitation as to the legal status of the mer-
chandise prevailed. "If Congress," says Mr. Beck, "before tak-
ing a leap in the dark could have asked an advisory opinion of
the Supreme Court it could have avoided a possible injustice;
but under our governmental method, due to the Montesquieu
doctrine, Congress could only pass the law, take a leap in the
dark and wait developments." Once again, he asserts, the time
factor possessed large potentialities for evil.
In short, commentators Beck and Broun, speaking for a
multitude of others, repeat the lament of Francis Bacon that
"our laws as they now stand are subject to great incertainties."
Like so many generations of men, they stress the need for legal
certainty. 9 As they see it, periods of doubt as to the constitu-
tionality of federal statutes affecting the most vital interests in
American life, must be eliminated."0 . If the present system of
judicial review is to continue they believe such issues must be
clarified by the Supreme Court at an early date. This involves
the adoption of the advisory opinion,3 a development deemed
inevitable by many students of the legal process. These stu-
dents point to the twentieth century trend toward "preventive
justice" in support of their view.32 In the light of these circum-
stances it might be well to consider some of the possibilities that
seem to accompany the practice.
At the outset it may be repeated that the adoption of the
29 See Frank, Law and the Modern; Pound, An Introduction to the Phil-
osophy of Law; Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science; Demogue, Analysis of
Fundamental Legal Notions, Modern French Legal Philosophy.
30 Hans Kelsen, one of the greatest living jurists, asserts that the chief
objection to the "l'exception d'inconstitutionnalite," or the American plan of
judicial review, is the uncertainty and insecurity of the law which necessarily
results from such practice. "La guarantie jurisdictionelle de la constitution,"
Annuarie de l'Institut International le Droit Public," Paris, 1929, cited by
C. G. Haines, p. 6ol, American Political Science Review, Vol. XXIV, Aug.,
1930.
31For a thorough analysis of the function of the advisory opinions see
Departmental Cooperation in State Government, Albert R. Ellingwood, p.
253 (i918).
32 See W. F. Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Administration (1929),
pp. 85-88.
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practice by the Supreme Court would effect no innovation in
Anglo-American legal practice. It has been widely used in
both England and in this country. Our Canadian neighbors
have also had a long and interesting experience with this de-
vice. 3 In fact, the governor-general or either house of parlia-
ment may require the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada
upon any question of law or fact concerning the constitutionality
of any dominion or provincial legislation or on any other matter
which the governor in Council sees fit to submit." Seven of the
nine Canadian provinces likewise require their respective courts
to answer similar questions.3
I- Albert R. Ellingwood, Departmental Cooperation in State Government,
PP. 79-93. In Canada, it should be said in passing, the practice of giving
advikory opinions does not encounter the doctrine of the separation of powers.
Neither does it have to concern itself with the problems arising out of the
extremely wide scope of judicial review of legislation which prevails under
our system. Despite this fact, the use of advisory opinions has encountered
judicial opposition in Canada, just as it has in England. The practice has
nevertheless been greatly reenforced by a comparatively recent decision of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. See Attorney General for Ontario
v. Attornley General for Canada, (91az), (A.C. 571). The history of the
Canadian practice in regard to advisory opinions appears in In Re Sunday
Leg., 35 Can. S. C. 581, (1905).
4 See Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, ch. 35, Sections 55-56; Attorney
General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada, A.C. 571, 585, 586
(1912).
as It is interesting to note that several of the South American countries
have alho experimented with the advisory opinion practice. The constitution
of Colombia (Constitution of 1886, Art. 90), and Panama (Constitution of
1904, Art. io5), provide for judicial participation in somewhat similar form.
See J. I. Rodriquez, American Constitutions, Vol. I, p. 278, 313, 375, 415;
Vol. 2, pp. 336, 337 (i9o6-19°7). When Hawaii was an independent state
the practice was in vogue there also. (Const. of 1854, Art. 88). The Colom-
bia provision is of some interest. The Constitution of Colombia of i886,
Art. 84, provides that the judge of the Supreme Court may take part in the
legislative debates over "bills relating to civil matters and judicial procedure."
And in the case of legislative acts which are objected to by the "government"
as unconstitutional if the legislature insist on the bill, as against the veto of
the government, it shall be submitted to the Supreme Court which is to decide
the question finally. Arts. 70 and x50. See Professor Moses' Translation,
supplement to Annals of Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science for Jan., 1893;
see ahko 7 H.L.R. 139. A considerable use of the advisory opinion was also
madc in Germany under the Constitution of Weimar, in order to avoid the
long delays and great inconveniences resulting from uncertainty as to the con-
stitutionality of an act. See Johannes Mattern, Principles of the Constitutional
Jurisprudence of t.e German Republic. (Baltimore, 1928), 257 ft.
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The English practice, by which the Crown and the House
of Lords consulted the judges on solemn occasions upon im-
portant questions of law, grew out of the close relations of the
English judges to the Crown and to the House of Lord§ in
those remote days when the political institutions of modern
England were in a simpler, less differentiated state." It will
be recalled that the English king was the fountain of justice and
the English national courts evolved from the curia regis as
more specialization of function became imperative."' The king,
and later the Privy Council, exercised the power, when acting
in a judicial capacity, of consulting the judges.
When the present Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
was created in 1833, it was given the duty of advising the Crown
on legal questions." The king's power to compel the attendance
of his judges in the curia regis also gave rise to the practice of
calling upon the judges to advise him in his executive capacity.
From the time of Edward the First on, judges have been called
upon to assist the House of Lords in both its judicial and leg-
islative capacities."
Although the practice has become so firmly fixed that the
judges are bound to give such advice on questions of law aris-
ing in cases before the house," the power has not been exercised
frequently in the recent times. This is particularly so since the
86 See Certificate of Judges, z Eden 371 (176o); Head v. Head, T.L.R.,
138-146 (823); Ex Parte Kent Co. Council, lz B. 725 (1891); see also
Opinions of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557, 561, 666.
7 Van Vechten Veeder, Advisory Opinions of the Judges of England, 13
Harv. L. Rev. 358; see also J. F. Baldwin, The King's Council in England
during the Middle Ages, (Oxford, 1913).
as 3 and 4 Win. IV, C. 41.
39 Since the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has been set up, it
is no longer necessary to call upon the judges when the opinion of the law
lords is considered insufficient. Nevertheless, parliamentary acts passed in
1888 and 192o have permitted calling upon the High Court for advice. See
51 and 52 Victoria Statutes, Vol. 25, ch. 41, sct. 29 (888); io and ii
George V Statutes, Ch. 30, 1 (1920). Such legislation has been opposed by
the judges however, and an attempt in 1928 to extend the practice was suc-
cessfully opposed the law lords. See Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, Vol. IX,
755, 795, 914 (1928).40 Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. i, 168.
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judicial functions of the House of Lords have been entrusted
to the law lords."
In this country a number of states have experimented with
the practice.4" Provisions for the rendition of advisory opinions
by the justices of the supreme court on canstitutional questions
propounded by the governor or legislature are to be found in
the constitutions of Massachusetts,"3 New Hampshire," Maine,45
Rhode Island," Florida,"7 Colorado,"8 and South Dakota."'
The second Missouri constitution also adopted the device
in 1865," ° but it was dropped when the third Missouri constitu-
4' Although the right of the House of Lords to ask the judges what the
law is, in order to inform itself how the law should be altered has not been
exercised recently, its existence was affirmed no later than i9Iz. Althougti
the judges refused to answer questions not confined to the strict legal construc-
tion of existing acts of Parliament, they are compelled to give opinions on
abstract questions of existing law. See In Re The London and Westminster
Bank, 2 Cl. and F. I9I, 193 (1934); M'Naghten's Case, io Cl. and F. zoo
(1843); Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Dominion,A.C. 571, 586 (i9iz).
41 Up to 1918, Mr. Ellingwood reports some 410 opinions requested and
given in eight states. These opinions, he asserts, "have been received for the
most part with all the deference accorded to the solemn decisions of a court
of last resort. Both the legislative department and the executive department
have usually treated the pronouncements of these opinions as final, and shaped
their course of action accordingly." Departmental Cooperation in State Gov-
ernments, 1918, p. 154. For a classification of these opinions see also 6 Am.
and English Encyclopaedia, 1070-1078, (2nd Ed.).
11 In 1780 the practice was introduced in the Massachusetts constitution
(pt. z, ch. z, art. z).
4" In 1784, the provisions of the Massachusetts constitution were copied
in the New Hampshire constitution of that year. (Now Art. 74, of the con-
stitution of 19oz).
45 In 18zo, the Massachusetts constitutional provisions on this subject were
copied in the Maine constitution (Art. 6, Sec. 3)-
" In 1842, the Massachusetts provisions were copied in the constitution of
Rhode Island (Art. X, sec. 3). These provisions were reaffirmed in 1903 in
Amendment XII, sec. z.
'7 In 1868, the practice was adopted in the Florida constitution. This
is now Art. IV, sec. 13-
48 Constitution of 1886 (Art. VI, sec. III).
"Constitution of 1889 (Art. V, sec. XIII).
" Art. VI, sec. II.
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tion was set up in 1 875.' In Alabama52 and Delaware53 advis-
ory opinions have been sanctioned by statute, without express
constitutional authority.5" In Vermont, a statute of 18 64 author-
izing advisory opinions was repealed in 1915. In Minnesota
a similar statute was also declared unconstitutional.56 In earlier
days advisory opinions were given in New York,"r Pennsyl-
vania,58 Nebraska," North Carolina,6" and Oklahoma6 without
constitutional or statutory authorization but the practice has
since been discontinued. In fact, the power to render advisory
opinions has been explicitly denied by the highest courts in New
York,62 Nebraska,"2 North Carolina," Connecticut," and Ohio.
" For a discussion of Missouri's experience, see Manley 0. Hudson, Ad-
visory Opinions of National and International Courts, 37 Harv. L. R. 970-
1001 (1924).
52 See Alabama Civil Code, Sections lO29O-91 (1923) ; Opinions of the
Justices, 209 Ala. 593 (1923).
5 Revised Code of Delaware, ch. 13, sec. 2, ch. iio; sec. 11 (1915).
54A Delaware statute of 185z has been ineffective until quite recently.
See 1852, Del. Rev. Stat., ch. 27; see also In re school Code of 1959, 30
Del. 406, io8 Ad. 39.
5 See Vermont Laws, 1915, No. 84.
56 Matter of the Senate, io Minn. 78 (1865).
17 See People v. Green, i Den. (N.Y.) 614, (1845).
58 See 3 Binney (Pa.), 595 (i9O8).
59 In Nebraska the practice existed without either constitutional or statu-
tory sanction. It no longer obtains. See In Re R. R. Commissioners, 15 Neb.
67, 5o N.W. 276 (1884); In Re School Funds, 15 Neb. 684, 5o N.W. 272
(884); In Re Babcock, 2I Neb. 500, 32 N.W. 641 (1887); In Re State
Warrants, 25 Neb. 659, 41 N.W. 636 (1889); In Re Senate File 3r, 25 Neb.
864, 41 N.W. 846 (1889); In Re Quaere of Procedure of Two Houses of
Legislature in Contests of Election of Executive Officers, 31 Neb. 262, 47
N.W. 923 (1891); In Re House Roll 284, 31 Neb. 505, 48 N.W. 275
(1891). For a critical discussion of the Nebraska practice see the dissenting
opinion of Justice Norval in, In Re Board of Public Lands and Buildings,
37 Neb. 425 (1893). The Nebraska practice was apparently discontinued
in 1898 by rule of the Supreme Court, 52 Neb. XVIII, Rule 32.
60 Opinions of the Justices, 64 N.C. 785, 792 (1870).
6.In Re Opinion of the Judges, 189-198, 17 Okl. Cr. 369 (192o); In
Re Opinions of the Judges, 195 P. 149, 18 Okl. Cr. 366 (1921).
62 Matter of State Industrial Commission, 224 N.Y. 13 (1918).
63Re Board of Public Lands, 37 Neb. 425 (1893).
64 Opinion of the Justices, 64 N.C. 785, 792 (1870).
65 Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn. 586 (1867).
66 State v. Baughman, 38 Ohio St. 455 (1882).
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The Massachusetts experiment is the most interesting and
possibly the most significant." In 1780, it was incorporated in
the constitution. In 1781, the first opinion was given.6" Since
then approximately one hundred and fifty opinions have been
rendered" and two efforts to secure the repeal of the advisory
practice have been defeated. The first attempt at repeal was
made in the constitutional convention of i82o and was spon-
sored by some of the greatest lawyers of that day."0 Although
the convention favored repeal, the people refused to adopt this
view.
o7 Frederick Grinnel, The Duty of the Court to Give Advisory Opinions,
z Mass. L. Quar. 542-552 (1917).
" Opinions of the Justices, x26 Mass. 547 (789); for a review of
Massachusetts precedents as well as early English precedents, see Opinions of
Justices, 126 Mass. 557, 561, 566 (789).
" " * * * it was ninety-seven years after the adoption of the constitution
of Massachusetts before the judges declined to answer. (1877, zz Mass. 6oo
et seq.). Former judges who had sat in the constitutional conventions of
1788-90, 182o, and 1853, were all of the opinion that the judges were
bound to answer the questions proposed to them by either department."
Hugo Dubuque, The Duty of Judges as Constitutional Advisers, 24 Amer.
L. Rev. 391-392 (1890).
1o "In I8zo, forty years after the constitution of Massachusetts was
adopted, a constitutional convention was held to revise it. Many of its promi-
nent members had been contemporaries of the constitution of 178o. Among
the eminent lawyers who participated in that convention were, Isaac Parker,
then chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Court; Lemuel Shaw, his immediate
successor; Levi Lincoln, afterwards judge of the same court and elected gov-
ernor; Charles Jackson, then on the supreme court bench of the state;
Joseph Story, the eminent author, then associate justice of the United States
Supreme Court; John Adams, the ex-president, who had drafted the original
constitution; Robert Rantoul, and Daniel Webster." (Journal of Deb. and
Proc. Mass. Convention 182O, p. 5 et seq. See also J. Story's Life and Letters,
386 et sey. (ed. 185). C. J. Parker sat on Supreme Bench of Mass. from
1814 to 1830; C. J. Shaw from I83O to 186o; J. Jackson, from 1813 to
18z 3 ; J. Lincoln from 1824 to 18z5). An attempt was made in that conven-
tion to repeal the clause authorizing the reference of questions to the judges.
Judge Story, who was chairman of the committee on the judiciary of which
C. J. Shaw and J. Lincoln were also members, made a report on the questions
criticizing the reference of questions to judges. In discussing the questions
before the convention, Judge Story further criticized the practice. In their
address to the people the constitutional convention went on record as opposed
to the practices. Although the convention favored the repeal, the people
refused to adopt their view. Hugo Dubuque, The Duty of Judges as Con-
,titutional Advisers, Z4 Amer. L. Rev. 391-393 (1890).
34 LAW JOURNAL- DECEMBER, 1937
In 1853, another constitutional convention was assembled."'
A second attempt was made to eliminate the advisory practice
by distinguished members of the legal profession."' Among
other arguments presented were criticisms that the provision
was in conflict with the Declaration of Rights, which expressly
provided for the independence" and the separation of the sev-
7' Debates Massachusetts Conventions, 1853, p. 4 (Boston, 1853).
72 "Among the eminent lawyers of this convention were the late Sidney
Bartlett, Rufus Choate, Marcus Morton, Jr., the present chief justice of
Massachusetts, and his father, Marcus Morton, Sr., who had been on the
supreme bench from 18z5 to 1840, when he was elected governor; Robert
Rantoul, who sat in the convention of 18zo; the late Otis P. Lord, afterwards
judge of the Supreme Court from 1875 to 188z; Professor Simon Greenleaf,
the famous author of the work on Evidence, etc.; Benajmin F. Butler; P.
Emory Aldrich (then) judge of the Massachusetts Supreme Court and author
of a valuable work on equity; Charles Sumner and Henry L. Dawes, United
States senators; and Joel Parker, formerly chief justice of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court." The then chief justice of Massachusetts offered a resolution
in the convention for the repeal of the section requiring the judges to advise
the departments. The chairman of the judiciary committee also made a report
in favor of repeal which was unanimously concurred in by the committee,
which included Judge Lord, Sidney Bartlett, and Simon Greenleaf. Hugo
Dubuque, The Duty of Judges as Constitutional Advisers, 24 Amer. L. Rev.
393-395 (189o).73 This opinion was apparently not shared by the men who adopted the
Massachusetts constitution of 178o. These men were strongly in favor of the
independence of the judiciary. In fact the dependence of colonial judges
upon the Crown was one of their chief causes of complaint against the English
government. John Adams, second president of the United States, who drafted
the Constitution of Massachusetts, was particularly active in advocating the
necessity of the independence of the judiciary. In 1773, he had a strong con-
troversy on this point with one General Brattle. Referring to his arguments
in his diary, he said: "These papers accordingly contributed to spread correct
opinions concerning the importance of the independence of the judges to
liberty and safety and enabled the convention of Massachusetts in 1779 to
adopt them in the constitution of the commonwealth. * * * The principles
developed in these papers have been generally, indeed, almost universally
prevalent among the American people from that time." See J. Adams, Life
and Works, pp. 316, 317. Samuel Adams was also a great advocate of the
independence of the judiciary. See Samuel Adams, Life and Works, pp. 8o
et seq. In short, there is considerable evidence to support the assumption that
the framers of the Massachusetts constitution of 178o, did not believe that
the clause requiring the judges to give advice to the other departments inter-
fered with the independence of the judiciary. See Hugo Dubuque, ibid,
PP. 373-374.
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eral branches.7" It was also argued that judges might be drawn
"into the vortex of politics"; that they might be called upon
"to decide questions of law affecting private rights without the
parties * * * having an opportunity of being heard"5 that the
"judges' decisions might deeply affect the rights of individuals
without their having the opportunity to be heard" T5 that the
74 In the constitutions of most states, writes Hugo Dubuque, there is an
express provision to the effect that the three coordinate branches of the govern-
ment shall be independent of each other, and where it is not so provided, he
adds, a distribution of power is so defined as to be tantamount to an express
provision to that effect. But he points out that in seven states the judges are
required to give opinions to the other departments under the constitution.
This demonstrates, he contends, that it was never meant that such requirement
should conflict with the principle of the absolute separation of the three
branches. "When their opinions are requested' under the constitution," he
says, "the judges become the constitutional advisers of the other department;
and their opinions have not the binding force of adjudications, like decisions
given by them in the regular course of judicial proceedings. In other words,
they do not give their opinion as a court, but they act individually, as official
advisers, in the same manner as the judges in England become the King's
counsel or advisers, in matters of law, when called upon to assist the king or
the House of Lords." (i Cooley's Blackstone, z9; 1 Coke's Int. i 1o. See
the valuable pamphlet of Professor J. B. Thayer, Legal Effect of Opinions of
Judges, Boston, 1885). Hugo Dubuque, ibid, p. 374.
7' In the case of State v. Baughman, 38 Ohio St. 455 (1882), the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that it was limited in its power to the decision
of such questions as properly arise in the due course of law, in a judicial pro-
ceeding within its jurisdiction and Judge Johnson speaking on the matter cf
advisory opinions repeated many of the arguments used above. He said in
part, "To be a judicial settlement the question decided must arise in a judicial
proceeding, properly before a court of competent jurisdiction. The division
of the powers of the state into legislative, executive, and judicial, and the
confiding of these powers to distinct departments is fundamental.
"It is essential to the harmonious working of this system that neither of
these departments should encroach on the powers of the other. If the judiciary
were to assume to decide hypothetical questions of law not involved in a judi-
cial proceeding in a cause before it, even though the decision would be of great
proceeding in a cause before it, even though the decision would be of great
value to the general assembly in the discharge of its duties, it would neverthe-
less be an unwarranted interference with the functions of the legislative
department that would be unauthorized and dangerous in its tendency. Not
only this, but it would be an attempt to settle questions of law involving the
rights of persons without parties before it, or a case to be decided in due process
of law, thus violating that provision of the Bill of Rights which declares that
every person shall have a remedy for an injury done him by due course
of law."
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judges were "called upon to give an opinion when loaded down
with labor"; that "the judges have to put off all other things
and attend to this, as well as they may, without a hearing, with-
out argument, and without time to investigate the authorities."
The voters of Massachusetts, apparently, were not im-
pressed with the weight of these contentions, for when the ques-
tion of repealing the advisory opinion clause was submitted to
them at the polls it was defeated, and the constitution of Massa-
chusetts stands on this question today as it did in 1780 when it
was originally adopted."
The Massachusetts experiment takes on an increased inter-
est, when observed in the light of our national experience. The
contrast is striking. At a very early date in our national history
it was decided that the doctrine of the separation of powers and
the nature of the federal judicial power, would prevent the
imposition of the practice upon the Supreme Court of the
United States. An attempt was made in the federal convention
of 1787 to confer upon the executive and Congress the right to
require opinions from the Supreme Court." This attempt
failed.
76 "It is worthy of note," writes Hugo Dubuque in 189o, "that notwith-
standing what has been said against this provision, in and out of the Conven-
tions, it has stood the test for one hundred and nine years in the Massachusetts
constitution, and we are yet to be referred to the harm which has resulted
from its application. The possibility of an abuse is an argument for the enact-
ment of repeal, but not for a particular construction of a law. In one instance
alone has an extra-judicial opinion in Massachusetts been reversed. (Op. Jus-
tices, 8 Mass. 547. The judges here held that even when the president called
out the militia under U. S. Const., Art. z, sec. 2, the several governors could
judge for themselves of the exigency, as chief commanders of the State's
militia. Such a view in the face of the clear provision of the U. S. Constitu-
tion could not stand. See Martin v. Mott, i z Wheat. 9). But many more
judicial opinions in cases assigned during the last century have suffered the
same fate; and that, too, at the hands of the same court and often of the same
judges. (See Bigelow's Overruled Cases, Williams' Mass Citations; Desty's
Federal Citations)." Dubuque, Ibid, pp. 393-395.
" See Max Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, 3 Vols. (New
Haven, 1911, Vol. II, p. 34). The clause, which was proposed by Mr.
Pinkney, was a verbatim copy of the corresponding part of the Massachusetts
convention adopted seven years before. It read as follows: "Each branch of
the legislature as well as the Supreme Executive shall have the authority to
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Although the constitution did not impose the duty upon the
Court, President Washington, who presided over the Constitu-
tional Convention, deemed it quite proper to request an advis-
ory opinion in 1793." Apparently he was not certain about the
matter until Chief Justice John Jay declined to accede to his
request." The incident arose out of the difficulties resulting
from Citizen Genet's handling of the Little Democrat in defi-
ance of the American government. At a meeting of the cabinet,
require the opinions of the Supreme Court upon important questions of law,
and upon solemn occasions." Nothing came of this attempt however. See I
Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution, 250. In the Federal Constitution
of 1787 while the power of declaring laws unconstitutional was recognized,
the limits of the power were also admitted. "In trying to make the judges
revi-e all legislative acts before they took effect, James Wilson pointed out
that laws might be dangerous and destructive, and yet not so unconstitutional
as to justify the judges in refusing to give them effect. 5 Elliot Debates, 344."
J. B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrines of Constitu-
tional LaWo, 7 Harv L. Rev., 140-141 (1893). See also Madison's Journal of
the Federal Convention. (Scott's ed.) 558-559.
71 Charles Warren asserts that while the impression was prevalent at that
time that the President had the right to seek the opinion of the judges on
questions of law, his move to do so, was the cause of much adverse criticism
in the Pro-French newspapers, one of which commented as follows: "It is
,aid that the judges have convened to assist the understanding of our executive
on the treaty between France and the United States. It is strange that lawyers
should be supposed capable of deciding upon common sense and plain lan-
guage; for such is the treaty." (National Gazette, July 29, 1793, letter signed
'Jubal'.) 'The Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. I, p. io9.
70 In 1790 Chief Justice Jay indicated his unwillingness to permit the
Court to express its judicial opinion except in a case litigated between parties
in a regular judicial proceeding. The incident occurred when Alexander
Hamilton, then secretary of the treasury, suggested that all the branches of
the government express opposition to the Virginia Resolutions. "At this time,"
writes Charles Warren, "excitement ran high, both in Congress and in the
Nation, over the projected legislation for assumption of State debts and
redemption of the public debt. The Virginia House of Representatives had
passed Resolutions terming the latter bill as 'dangerous to the rights and sub-
versive to the interests of the people and demands the marked disapproval of
the General Government,' and denounced the bill as 'repugnant to the Consti-
tution of the United States, as it goes to the exercise of a power not expressly
granted to the General Government.'
" 'This is the first symptom,' writes Hamilton, 'of a spirit which must
either be killed or it will kill the Constitution of the United States. I send
the resolution to you that it may be considered what ought to be done. Ought
not the collective weight of the different parts of the Government to be
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writes John Marshall, it was determined "to request the an-
swers of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States
to a series of questions comprehending all the subjects of differ-
ences which existed between the executive and the minister of
France relative to the exposition of the treaties between the two
countries.""0
In accordance with this plan, Jefferson wrote a letter8' on
July 18, 1793, asking the judges whether the President might
seek their advice on questions of law.8" Some twenty-nine ques-
tions were submitted to the judges at this time. On August 8,
1793, the justices refused to grant the request." They found
"strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially
employed in exploding the principles they contain? This question arises out
of sudden and undigested thought.'
"Jay replied in cool and restrained language that he considered it unde-
sirable to take any action! 'Having no apprehension of such measures, what
was to be done appeared ito be a question of some difficulty as well as impor-
tance. To treat them as very important might render them more so than I
think they are. The assumption will do its own work; it will justify itself
and not want advocates. Every indecent interference of State Assemblies will
diminish their influence; the National Government has only to do what is
right, and if possible, be silent. If compelled to speak, it should be in few
words, strongly evinced of temper, dignity, and self-respect'." The Supreme
Court in United States History, Vol. I, pp. 52-53. On p. iO of the same
book, however, are newspaper reports that would seem to indicate that John
Jay did grant something in the nature of an advisory opinion in 1792. Accord-
ing to this report the Trustees of the National Sinking Fund comprising the
Vice-President, the Secretary of State, Treasury, Attorney General, and the
Chief Justice asked from Chief Justice Jay an opinion as to the constitution-
ality of the law, and Jay rendered a written opinion, March 31, 1792, N. Y.
Daily Adv., March 9, 1793-8 0 John Marshall, Life of George Washington, pp. 432-441.
81 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. i, p. io8.
82 Jared Sparks, Writings of George Washington, z2 Vols., Boston, 1834-
1838, Vol. X (1836), appendix XVIII; Charles Warren, The Supreme Court
in United States History, Vol. 7, PP- io8 et sey.; Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 354 (91)-
83 It is interesting to note that the twenty-nine questions asked were diffi-
cult to answer, coming as they did in a time of high political excitement, when
passions were at a fever heat. Professor Thayer suggests that if the questions
had been "brief and easily answered the Court might, not improbably, have
slipped into the adoption of a precedent that would have engrafted the English
usage upon our national system." Thayer, Legal Essays, p. 54.
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deciding the questions alluded to, especially as the power given
by the constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of
departments for opinions seems to have been purposefully as
well as expressly united to the executive departments."'
"Considering themselves merely as constituting a legal tri-
bunal for the decision of controversies brought before them in
legal form," wrote John Marshall, "those gentlemen deemed
it improper to enter the field of politics by declaring their opin-
ions on questions, not growing out of the case before them.""
Since that time the Supreme Court has refused to give such
opinions, even when they are brought forward in the guise of
formal legislation."6 It limits its work to actual litigation inter
partes. It bases its policy on its conception of the requirements
of the separation of powers, and on the constitutional provision
as to the "judicial power," which extends to "cases and contro-
versies." Its consideration of constitutional matters is accord-
ingly limited to the determination of questions arising in liti-
s Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, Vol. III, 488, 489.
John Marshall, Life of George TVashington, p. 441.
See a series of decisions from Hepburn's Case, ? Dall, 409 (U.S.)
1792 to Mushrat v. United States, zI9 U.S. 346 (1911); Burdick, Law of
the American Constitution, (1924), pp. 132-135. The High Court of
Australia als-o refuses to render "advisory opinions," for similar reasons. See
Luna Park Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, 3z Comm. L. R. 596 (1923).
11 "The Federal Judiciary can be called upon to decide controversies
brought before them in legal form; and therefore are bound to abstain from
any extra-judicial opinions upon points of law, even though solemnly suggested
by the executive." Story's Commentaries on Constitution, 5 th ed. sec., 1571.
See also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1ii), in which
X\r. Justice Day says: "The exercise of the judicial power is limited to
'cases' and 'controversies'. Beyond this it does not extend and unless it is
aserted in a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution, the
power to exercise it is nowhere conferred." See comment by Charles E.
Hughes in 45 Amer. Bar. Assn. Reports, 266. For an interesting discussion
of the American practice by a Canadian jurist who opposes the advisory
opinion see the remarks of Justice Idington in In the Matter of a Jurisdiction
of a Province to Legislate Respecting Abstention from Labour on Sunday,
35 Can. Supreme Court, 58I (1905), (Reference by Governor General in
Council), at p. 604.
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gated cases."8 However, it has never been difficult to raise a
test case. 9
It is interesting to speculate as to what the result would
have been if the court, in the words of Thayer, had "slipped
in" to the practice of rendering advisory opinions in 1793. Some
observers believe that if the practice had been adopted the Su-
preme Court would have been dragged into one political con-
troversy after another and would have suffered a terrific loss
of prestige as a result.9" Other observers, including Mr. Beck,
88 James M. Beck asserts that the Supreme Court gave an advisory opinion
in the administration of President Monroe on the question as to the power of
the Federal Government to make appropriations for improvements wholly
within a state. The Future of the Supreme Court; an address delivered at the
Annual Dinner of the Pennsylvania Society of New York, Dec. 20, 1924,
p. 16. (Pamphlet published by Allen, Lane, and Scott, Philadelphia). -_
8" Mr. Beck points out that as early as Washington's Administration the
"test" case was in use. At that time Alexander Hamilton wanted to secure the
opinion of the Supreme Court as to the nature of a direct tax. With that
object in mind he created a fictitious case of a supposed owner of 125 "char-
iots" and the Government paid the counsel for both parties. James Beck,
ibid, p. x5. Mr. Walter F. Dodd in discussing the steadily increasing number
of cases involving constitutional questions as they affect state government says:
"In view of the increased frequency with which Courts pass upon the validity
of statutes, it is natural that they should have weakened the early doctrine
that the question of constitutionality should be decided only as an incident
to the determination of a bona fide controversy between parties. For a number
of years, questions of constitutionality have been largely decided in cases
where a person adversely affected by a statute seeks an injunction to prevent
its enforcement, or where a person beneficially affected seeks a mandamus to
compel action under the statute. The issue of constitutionality in most cases of
this kind is the sole issue presented for the Court's determination, and the case
is made for the sole purpose of determining that issue." (This attitude is
indicated by the United States Supreme Court in Hygrade Provision Co. v.
Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925). There the court permitted the use of an
injunction to contest the validity of a New York law punishing persons who
sought to sell "kosher" meat when it was not actually such. Declaratory judg-
ment acts are now coming to be used in the same manner as injunctions). This
is now well recognized by counsel in almost all of the cases involving the
validity of important statutes. Instead of being an incident, the issue as to
the validity of the statute is the whole case. Dodd, State Government (2nd
Ed.), 1928, p. 129.
80 "By the firm stand thus taken at so early a stage in the career of the
new Government, and by declining to express an opinion except in a case
duly litigated before it, the Court established itself as a purely judicial body;
and its success in fulfilling its function has followed its adhering to this exclu-
sive method of deciding questions of law and of the constitutionality of
statutes." Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. i,
P. III.
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believe the adoption of the practice would have worked incal-
culable gain for the nation. "Massachusetts," says Mr. Beck,
"has had this procedure for more than a century and its highest
court, far from losing its prestige and reputation, ranks second
to none among the State judiciaries."" "One such fact," he
adds, "is worth a thousand theories.""
The procedure required would be simple enough if the
ivlassachusetts practice were to be followed. The President, by
written request, or either house of Congress by resolution, could
submit to the judges of the Supreme Court a number of ques-
tions affecting a proposed measure or action. Answers could be
given by the judges collectively or seriatim. In giving these
answers the justices would not be acting as a court," but as the
constitutional advisers of the other departments of govern-
ment.' The opinions given would be those of the individual
judges and not the opinion of the Court." They would not be
binding in later litigation under the rule of stare decisis but
would undoubtedly be considered carefully and exercise a strong
influence upon the court's action." Moreover, the judges could
o1 James M. Beck, The Future of the Supreme Court, p. 2 1.
%12 James M. Beck, The Future of the Supreme Court, p. 21.
. In Colorado, it is claimed that the judges act as a court. This is at
variance with the practice elsewhere. See In Re Senate Res., 12 Col. 466, 21
Pac. 479 (1889); see alho Green v. Comm., x2 Allen (Mass.) 155 (1886);
Answer to the Justices, 95 Me. 564, 51 Ad. 224. See J. B. Thayer, The
Nation, Dec. 12, 1889, pp. 476-477.
" There is a well-defined distinction between judges acting as a court
and in the capacity of an adviser. The former adjudicates, settles, and decides;
the latter gives an opinion upon questions propounded, he throws upon them
the light of his learning. (See Legal Effect of Opinions by Judges, by Prof.
J. B. Thayer, Dean of Harvard Law School, I885). The moment a court
ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature in any case
where the constitution has vested the legislature with power over the subject-
matter, that moment it enters upon a field where it is impossible to set limits
to its authority, and where its discretion alone will measure the extent of its
interference. (Cooley's Const. Lim., 2oi and cases cited). And there is
great force in the statement of Judge Cooley, that 'courts, (judges) cannot
run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason and expediency with the
law-making power.' (i1d, p. 204." Hugo Dubuque, ibid, pp. 395-396.
See Reply of Judges of the Supreme Court to the General Assembly,
33 Conn. 586.
" See Loring v. Young, 239 Mass. 349, 361 (192i).
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refuse to express an opinion when they saw fit. At least, judges
in Massachusetts," Maine," Missouri,99 and Colorado,... have
frequently exercised the right to pass upon the reasonableness
of the demand made upon them. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court could limit the scope of its duty in this connection by
requiring that no private rights be involved .0' that the question
be publici juris and framed with sufficient definiteness; that no
questions of fact be in issue;'0 2 and that no question of a nature
affecting private interests be considered.0 '
While the procedural requirements of the practice present
little difficulty, it is not so clear that the adoption of the practice
in 1793 would have worked the beneficial results claimed for it.
When it is argued that the practice permits the prompt settle-
ment of legal doubts and avoids the waste of enacting legislation
which the courts subsequently invalidate, it is assumed, appar-
ently, that the Supreme Court's opinions in advance of legisla-
tion will grind out controlling legal principles, which will re-
solve all doubts for good and all' But the workings of the
" Answer of the Justices, 148 Mass. 6z3 (1889).
" Answer of the Justices, 95 Me. 564 (1901).
I"In re N. Mo.Ry., 51 Mo. 586 (i873).
100 Interrogatories of the Senate, 54 Col. 166 (1913).
101 Opinion of the Court, 6z N.H. 704 (1816) ; Opinions of the Justices,
i9o Mass. 6ii (19o6).
1' Dinan v. Swig, 223 Mass. 516 (1916).
'o3 In. re Opinion of the Judges, 43 S. Dak. 645, 647 (1920).
105 Judge Hutcheson points out some of the obstacles encountered by those
searching for "perfect formulas, fact proof, concepts, so general, so flexible,
that in their terms, the jural relations of mankind can be stated." The Judg-
ment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14
Corn. L. Q. 274. "The law always has been, is now, and will ever continue
to be, largely vague and variable. And how could this be otherwise? The
law deals with human relations in their most complicated aspects. The whole
confused, shifting, helter-skelter of life parades before it-more confused
than ever, in our kaleidoscopic age."
-'Even in a relatively static society, men have never been able to construct
a comprehensive, eternized set of rules anticipating all legal disputes and
settling them in advance. Even in such an order, no one can foresee all the
future permutations and combinations of events; situations are bound to arise
which were never contemplated when the original rules were made. How
much less is such a frozen legal system possible in modern time." Jerome
Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, p. 6.
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American constitutional system does not seem to bear this out.
The record there shows clearly that attempts to deal with consti-
tutional questions abstractly are bound to meet difficulties and
result in conclusions that are quite unrelated to actuality.
For constitutionality, as Felix Frankfurter points out, is
not a fixed quality, nor can it ever be so.' A completely frozen
constitutional content would require an "infinite immobility of
society.".. 7 We have never had that, and never will. We live
in a world of change. "If a body of law were in existence ade-
quate for the civilization of today," says Justice Cardozo, "it
could not meet the demands of the civilization of tomorrow."'' l
Constitutional content is necessarily variable.'10 It is being con-
stantly overhauled, and adapted to the realities of ever-changing
social, industrial, and political conditions.1 ' In consequence,
some of the most important cases decided by the Court are re-
solved into a judgment upon the facts. The cases which are
frequently most important are concerned not with legal prin-
ciples, but the application of admitted principles to complicated
and elusive facts.'11
The truth of this statement can be best realized by a "study
of the two thousand odd cases which have spun meaning out of
the Delphic phrase 'without due process of law'.""' 2  The
method of the Court in these cases is the empirical one of prick-
ing out a line by the "gradual approach and content of decisions
10 Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
1004-1005 (1924).
111 Demogue, Analysis of Fundamental Legal Notions, Vol. 7, Modern
Legal Philosophy Series, p. 445.
'o Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, pp. Io-i i.
'o "New instruments of production, new modes of travel and dwelling,
new credit and ownership devices, new concentrations of capital, new social
customs, habits, aims, and ideals--all these factors of innovation make vain the
hope that definite legal rules can be drafted that will forever after solve all
legal problems." Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, p. 6.
110 Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Ideas Behind the New Deal," New York
Times Magazine, July i6, 1933.
"I Frankfurter, ibid, pp. oo4-IOO5.
112 See Frankfurter, ibid, pp. ioo4-iooS; see also Charles M. Hough:
Due Process of Law Today, 3z Harv. L. Rev. z 18.
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on the opposing side";".. or defining by a gradual process of
"inclusion and exclusion.".. 4 Indeed there is small choice in the
matter. The constitutional questions raised here cannot be
solved in terms of vague abstractions." 5 Broad and indetermi-
nate concepts like "due process" and "liberty" take on meaning
only when construed in terms of human facts.
The same principle operates when we attempt to ascertain
the nature, scope, and limitations of the "commerce" clause;
involving as it does the delicate problem of dividing power
between the state and nation." 6 The "commerce" clause from
Gibbons v. Ogden in the days of the steamship to the Schechter
case in the days of the aeroplane has had a highly variable
meaning." ' Since cases involving the "due process" clause and
the "commerce" clause have been the most prolific source of
litigation for the Supreme Court since the Civil War,"' the con-
clusion is inescapable, that the stuff of most of our constitutional
controversies are facts and judgments upon factsi and that it
would be impossible to resolve them in the dim, nebulous, half-
world of abstraction." 9
"i Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
"
4 Hurtado v. Calif., IIO U.S. 516 (188o).
116 "Concepts like 'liberty' and 'due process of law' are too vague in
themselves to solve issues. They derive meaning only if referred to adequate
human facts. Facts and facts again are decisive. They are either present-day
facts, or ancient facts clothed by the universalizing instinct of man to look
like principles. Not the least of constitutional exploded facts persisting ah
legal assumptions." Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37
Harv. L. Rev. ioo4-1oo5 (1924).
116 Mr. Walter Lippman has discussed some of the difficulties involved in
any attempt to reduce to writing a distribution of power between the states
and the nation within the federal system, that will be dearly definitive. "A
Way to Commit Suicide," Today, July 27, 1935. See also, Raymond Moley,
"A Reply to Mr. Lippman," Today, August 3, 1935. For Mr. Lippmann's
rebuttal, see "A Reply," Today, August 31, 1935. For Mr. Moley's sugges-
tion with regard to a constitutional amendment, see "Beyond the NRA,"
Today, June 8, 1935.
"1 Walter Lippman, "A Reply," Today, August 31, 1935, p. 3.
118 Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court.
119 "The reports are strewn with wrecks of legislation considered in
vacuo and torn out of the context of life which evoked the legislation and
alone made it intelligible. (See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale
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Another weakness of the practice is discernible when ques-
tions are submitted to the judges with regard to the validity of
proposed legislation. Legislation by the very nature of things
is an experimental process. Engaged in the difficult task of con-
triving a design for the future, legislators largely base their
efforts on probabilities. "Every year, if not every day," re-
marks Justice Holmes, "we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.""12 This cer-
tainly applies to the work of legislators. Building, on their
hopes and fears and not on demonstrated facts, they need every
opportunity for putting their prophecies to a test. But when the
question of the constitutionality of proposed legislation is sub-
mitted to the judges for an advisory opinion, rather than the
question of the validity of the finished statutory product which
has passed through the "beneficent ordeal" of public discussion,
legislative debate and analysis, plus deliberate enactment, they
are not receiving that opportunity.
In this circumstance the judges are considering legislative
doubts rather than legislative convictions. This procedure,
Felix Frankfurter believes, deprives the legislator of his fullest
creative opportunity, since facts may be established in favor of
measures after their enactment which could not possibly be
brought forward previous to that time.' "Nothing changes
L. J. 454; Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional
Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 353). These are commonplaces. But they are the
heart of the matter of American constitutional law. A failure scrupulously
and persistently to observe these commonplaces jeopardizes the traditional
American constitutional system more than all the loose talk about "usurpation."
(Lack of historical scholarship, combined with fierce prepossessions, can alone
account for the persistence of this talk. One would suppose that, at least,
after the publication of Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution,
there would be an end to this empty controversy." Frankfurter, A Note on
Advisory Opinion, 37 Harv L. Rev. 1002-1003 (1924).
12 " Abrams v. U. S., 250 U.S. 623; Lief, The Dissenting Opinions of
Mr. Justice Holmes, p. 50.
'2'- Mr. Frankfurter points out that the accidents of litigation may give
time for the vindication of laws which a priori may run counter to deep pre-
possessions, or speculative claims of injustice. He calls attention to National
Union Fire Insurance Co. v. T1anberg, 260 U.S. 71, 77 (I9zz), where it
was said: "The statute here in questions has been enforced since 1913, and
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more easily than statutes intended by their own expressions to
be eternal," says Demogue, "for nothing runs greater risk of
becoming out of date, of accommodating itself badly to new
circumstances."122 This rule works both ways, however, and
time may vindicate some statutes which might have been choked
out at the beginning by an advisory opinion which could not
hope to foresee all the possibilities involved.
Another defect of the practice concerns the technique in-
volved. It is one thing to appraise the validity of legislation, or
legislative authority, in the ordinary process of adjudication;
and something quite different to attempt the same task by the
advisory practice. In all jurisdictions, jurists faced with the
perplexing problem of formulating an opinion in advance of
litigation have forcibly expressed the inadequacy of their posi-
tion. Their statements have such a convincing ring that one
wonders whether an opinion given in such an unfavorable
atmosphere would not cause more damage to all concerned than
the slower moving practice of testing the measure after it was
on the books.'23 If in the one case there are wastes involved in
it does not seem to have driven companies out of the hail insurance business,
an indication that they are able profitably and safely to adjust themselves and
their methods to its requirements." A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv.
L. Rev. i005-I006 (1924). Incidentally, it may be remarked that some
observers assert that the strategy of New Deal lawyers in delaying decision of
constitutionality, was apparently predicated on the philosophy that what may
be of questionable validity today, may tomorrow be difficult to overthrow.
122 "Analysis of Fundamental Notions," Modern French Legal Philoso-
PAY, P. 452.
123 "Even on technical questions concerning merely the internal structure
of government, ill-considered advisory opinions before the event may become
millstones around the necks of succeeding generations. Chaffee has kindly
called attention to In re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. 649 (1883),
which has been an effective obstruction to the modernization of the Rhode
Island Constitution of 1842. See Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, 4th
ed., sec. 450 et sey.; Opinion on the Calling of a Constitutional Convention
in Rhode Island (pamphlet by G. T. Brown et al). In this opinion- the
Rhode Island Supreme Court advised the General Assembly that the Rhode
Island Constitution of 1842 could not be organically revised by the people
through a Constitutional Convention and that changes in the Constitution
could only be secured by submission through the legislature of specific amend-
ments, lack of which requires a three-fifths majority of the electors for its
ratification." F. Frankfurter: A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L.
Rev., IOO8-IOO9 (1924).
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closing the barn-door after the horse is stolen, in the other case
there is the possibility of an opinion which has not been well
considered.
If the judges lack competent legal assistance and have little
time for mature deliberation, they cannot be held altogether
responsible if ill-considered opinions result."2 4 In some states
the attorney general is supposed to render assistance to the
judges upon request, but in practice very little assistance from
counsel has been given."' This is an important fact, for our
courts have always depended greatly on the researches of coun-
sel in arriving at their own conclusions. The lawyer's r~le in
adjusting law to changing needs has been no small one. "Web-
ster," says Karl Llewellyn, "not Marshall, made the Dart-
mouth College case."' 2
With no argument of counsel, with no searching investiga-
tion of the principles involved, the judges can arrive at a con-
clusion only by consulting among themselves and comparing
their several views on the matters. 2 This does not seem to be a
124 "In the attitude of court and counsel, in the availability of facts
which underlie litigation," says Felix Frankfurter, "there is a wide gulf
between opinion in advance of legislative or executive action, and decisions in
litigation after such proposals are embodied in law or carried into execution."
Social Science Encyclopedia, p. 478.
I' Karl Llewellyn has assembled an impressive list of highly important
legal contrivances which have been created by the engineering skill of the
lawyer. He shows the lawyers shaping the thousands of uses of the law of
trusts; producing the bond that forms the basis of the investment market;
maneuvering by way of trusts the first great consolidations; making party
politics a possibility, and so on ad infinitum. Bramblebush, p. I52.
121 "Growth in law, especially growth in case law, has been attributed too
lightly in most legal writings to the courts. I would neither deny or belittle
the part that courts play in that growth. But how many judges do you know,
of whom it may be said as it once was of Holmes, 'the trouble with that fellow
is that he is always deciding cases on points that were not raised in the briefs
of either side'? How many judges do you know whose analysis of the case
and of the situation is a major fresh creation, a 'Let there be light,' rather
than the lesser type of building which consists in merely modifying the theory
of one advocate or of the other? The job of choosing wisely between the
inventions of counsel is a difficult one. The job of consistent wise choice is
tremendous, yet it is not of itself the major work. That has been done,
consistently, continuously by the bar." Bramblebush, p. 153.
127 See Reply of Judges of the Supreme Court to the General Assembly,
33 Conn. 586.
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very satisfactory arrangement. Then, too, when the advisory
practice is made a part of a court's procedure, the burden of
work imposed on the judges is bound to be increased.128 The
effect of this is obvious. With less time and attention to give,
the quality of their work is bound to suffer.12"
Perhaps some of the difficulties mentioned can be overem-
phasized. The political implications of the practice cannot be
easily overlooked. Wherever and whenever the practice has
been suggested or put into effect it has been opposed on the
ground that it tended to involve the judges too intimately in
matters of policy. The result of this involvement, it is claimed,
weakened confidence in the disinterestedness of the judicial
function, and also weakened the responsibility of the legislature
and the people, who seem quite willing to pass the burden to
the judiciary.
It is interesting to note that observers as widely removed as
Sir Henry Maine and Alexis De Tocqueville have urged the
importance of keeping the Supreme Court a strictly judicial
body. Fearing the political effects of a different system, they
would have the court exercise its power of measuring constitu-
128 "In Nebraska the Attorney General and not the Supreme Court is the
legal adviser of the Executive and Legislative departments. We are aware
that this Court has, in some instances, assumed to answer questions submitted
by other branches of the State Government, and then I, with much reluctance,
assented. The Court is now burdened with business. The number of suits
brought annually to this Court has so increased that the last legislature created
a Supreme Court Commission to assist in the disposal of the numerous cases
on the docket, and it seems to me, in justice to litigants, who have actions
pending, it is time for the Court to call a halt, and entertain jurisdiction
only in causes where the same is conferred by the Constitution." Remarks
of Justice Norval in 37 Neb. 435.
129 Professor Updegraff believes that objections to the advisory opinion
practice cannot be sustained on the grounds that the court must act as both
court and counsel, without the assistance of either brief or argument. He
believes that steps could easily be taken to supply all the assistance necessary
in this connection. Neither is he impressed with the argument that the prac-
tice would tend to overburden the court. Here again, he believes, steps could
be taken to supply the courts with all the assistance necessary to adequately
meet any additional burdens cast upon them. Paul C. Clovis and Clarence
Updegraff, Advisory Opinions, 13 Iowa L. Rev. 188 (i9z8).
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tionality, only in deciding a given case. 3' "The process is
slower," says Sir Henry Maine, "but freer from suspicion of
pressure and much less provocative of jealousy than the submis-
sion of broad and emergent political propositions to a judicial
body."
132
De Tocqueville strikes a similar note. "The American
judge," he says, "is brought into the political arena indepen-
dently of his own will; he only judges the law because he is
obliged to judge a case. The political question which he is
called upon to resolve is connected with the interest of the
parties, and he cannot refuse to decide it without abdicating the
duties of his post."' 32 Under these circumstances, he thinks,
constitutional pronouncements upon political questions are much
less likely to arouse distrust and criticism than if the court de-
cided such questions without parties in controversies.
While it is a difficult and unsatisfactory task to discuss such
a broad concept as "popular responsibility" and the effect the
advisory practice may have upon it; it is a subject, nevertheless,
that deserves careful attention. James Bradley Thayer, a close
student of the American constitutional system, and equally
familiar with the Massachusetts practice, held the view that the
American system would operate most effectively if judicial
activity was strictly limited insofar as it related to a review of
"' In the language of Mr. Justice Mathews, the Court "has no jurisdic-
tion to pronounce any statute either of a state, or of the United States, void
because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to
adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. In the exercise of
this jurisdiction, it is bound by two rules to which it has rigidly adhered:
one, never to anticipate a question of Constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it (see Howatt v. Kansas, z58 U.S. 181 (1922)); the
other, never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Steamship v. Commissioner,
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
131 Sir Henry Maine, Popular Government, (1885), p. 223; see also
Simeon Baldwin, The American Judiciary, (905), pp. 32-33.
112 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. i, p. 129.
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legislation. 3 ' Like Holmes". and many others... he advocated
a policy of judicial self-abnegation." 6 Opposing any tendency
which encouraged the people to look to the judiciary for the
protection of their constitutional guarantees," 7 he argued, that
the people would have become more vigilant in their own be-
half; if the habit of depending upon the judges, as the "guard-
ians of their rights" was broken.
In this general view, "it is a gigantic illusion that the Su-
preme Court can defend the Constitution"; s. since constitu-
tional guarantees of one kind or another derive their force and
influence from the sanction and approval of the people When
that is withdrawn, they fail completely." 9 If the people through
indifference, lack of understanding, or delibate choice, permit
their constitutional guarantees to be abrogated, "a few judges
and an ancient document" will never save them. The courts,
"'3 "If the decision in Munn v. Illinois, and in the Granger cases, twenty-
five years ago, and in the Legal Tender cases, nearly thirty years ago, had
been different; and the legislation there in question, thought by many to be
unconstitutional and by many more to be ill-advised, had been set aside, %re
should have been saved some trouble and some harm. But I venture to think
that the good which came to the country and its people from the rigorous
thinking that had to be done in the political debates that followed, from the
infiltration through every part of the population of sound ideas and senti-
ments, from the rousing into activity of opposing elements, the enlargement
of ideas, the strengthening of moral fibre, and the growth of political experi-
ence which came out of it all-that all this far more than outweighed any evil
which ever flowed from the refusal of the Court to interfere with the work
of the legislature.
"The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function now
lamentably too uncommon, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people and
to deaden its sense of moral responsibility. It is no light thing to do that."
Thayer's Marshall, 103, 1 so, and Legal Essays, (Boston, 1908), 39-41.
1"4 See Lief, The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes, p. z85;
see also Silas Bent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, pp. 184, ZZ4, Z25-26,
34z-343.
135 Charles G. Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy,
pp. 475-478.
136 Maurice Finklestein, Judicial Self Limitation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338
(i924); Melville F. Weston, Political Questions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. z96
(1925).
137Thayer, Legal Essays, pp. 3 9-41 (1908).
sAmer. Bar Ass'n. Jour., p. 607 (Oct., 1934).
"' Amer. Bar Ass'n. Jour. pp. 498-540 (Sept., 1933).
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says Alexis De Tocqueville, are "the all-powerful guardians of
a people which respects law but they would be impotent against
popular neglect or popular contempt."' 4 °  If the views of
Thayer and De Tocqueville have weight, popular responsibility
is weakened, insofar as the advisory opinion practice tends to
increase the dependency of the people upon their judges.
The Thayer suggestions merit careful attention. If fol-
lowed, the courts of the country would resolutely adhere to
first principles. "Let them consider," he says, "how narrow is
the function which the Constitutions have conferred on them-
the office merely of deciding litigated cases; how large, there-
fore, is the duty entrusted to others, and above all to the legisla-
tures?'' It is the legislature, he asserts, "which is charged
primarily with the duty of judging of the constitutionality of
its work." Since the constitution generally gives them no au-
thority to call upon a court for advice, and the courts may never
be able to say a word, the legislatures, he believes, must decide
for themselves.
In most European countries, the guardianship of the con-
stitutions belongs to the legislatures, and "subject to a reversal
by popular referendum or the election of a new assembly, the
legislature determines the limits of its own authority and exer-
cises control over the other departments of government."'
4
'
While European experience may not assist us entirely, because
140 "The peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of the Union were
placed in the hands of these judges. Without their active cooperation the
Constitution would be a dead letter. The Executive appeals to them for
assistance against the encroachments on the legislative powers. The legislature
demands their protection from the designs of the Executive. They defend
the Union from the disobedience of States, the States from the exaggerated
claims of the Union, the public interest against the interests of private citizens,
and the conservative spirit of order against the fleeting innovations of democ-
racy. Their power is enormous, but is clothed in the authority of public
opinion. They are the all-powerful guardians of a people which respects law
but they would be impotent against popular neglect or popular contempt."
De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. i, pp. i9i-i9z.
'"' Thayer, Legal Essays, pp. 35-41.
142 Charles G. Haines: "Some Phases of the Theory and Practices of
Judicial Review of Legislation in Foreign Countries," American Political
Science Review, Vol. XXIV, (Aug., 1930), pp. 591-592.
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of basically different philosophies on the nature of the judicial
process, 4 it can disprove the claim that a written constitution
with limits on the power of government, becomes a mere "scrap
of paper" if not guarded and protected by the judiciary.' For,
as our foremost student of the subject points out, the experience
in Belgium and Switzerland indicates "that legitimate private
rights and privileges are likely to receive adequate protection
without a judicial guardianship of the written Constitution."' 45
If the holders of legislative power are careless, or ineffec-
tive, the courts cannot improve the matter by attempting a func-
tion not their own. On the other hand, as Thayer suggested, if
143 "Whereas the doctrine of judicial review of legislation is regarded in
the United States as a necessary requirement in the application of the theory
of the separation of powers, in Europe such a doctrine is generally thought to
involve a confusion, and not a separation of powers. Building on the principle
that there are only two great functions of government, namely, to make and
to execute the laws, and that of necessity these functions must be carried out
with the closest unity and cooperation possible, the judiciary is considered as
a subordinate agency of these functions operating more directly under the
control and direction of the executive department. To allow the Courts to
check either or both of the primary functions of the state is thought to make
the judges masters over all of government. Instead of establishing through
judicial review, as Americans contend, a government of law and not of men,
European jurists argue that it is precisely because the law is supreme that the
legislature is placed above the other powers. Supremacy must reside in one
department of government, and to European thinkers both reason and experi-
ence point to the legislature as the logical depository for supreme authority."
Ibid, pp. 588-589.
144 European jurists are inclined to believe that the review of legislation
by the Courts places the judiciary in a position of supremacy. As they see it
this raises the question as to whether jurists, or men engaged in political life,
are better qualified to make such final decisions.
"The decisive questions are these: From what class should be selected
the men who exercise a supreme control in a country? Ought they to be
exclusively jurists, or men engaged in political life? For there is a marked
difference between the two classes. The traditionalist spirit is much more
accentuated with the former than with the latter. We observe, then, in last
analysis, a conflict between two great tendencies, which are characteristic of
human actions: on the one hand, a tendency which is conservative and tradi-
tionalist, and on the other hand, I would not call it a progressive tendency (for
the question as to what is progress is not exactly determined), but a tendency
to change, to seek the new. To the former class, it is observed, belong the
judges, to the latter, legislators. Louis La Fur, 29 Revue du Droit Public,
(192), 313, 314." Quoted by Charles G. Haines, ibid, pp. 591-592.
'" Ibid, pp. 592-593.
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the courts adhere to the letter of their limited duty, it will help
to fix the responsibility for legislative inadequacies with the
legislature, where it belongs, and "bring down on that precise
locality the thunderbolt of popular condemnation." The judid-
ary today, he asserts, "in dealing with the acts of coordinate
legislatures, owes to the country no greater or dearer duty than
that of keeping its hands off these acts whenever it is possible
to do it. That will greatly help to bring the people and their
representatives to a sense of their own responsibility.146
In conclusion, it may be repeated that the disadvantages of
the advisory opinion are numerous. Popular responsibility is
weakened; a proper legislative functioning is discouraged; and
the judicial branch suffers as well. For the courts are not able
to assume the additional burdens with grace. This type of
responsibility, says Felix Frankfurter, should never be "shifted
to the tribunal whose task is the most delicate in our whole
system of government, involving as it does, the power to set
limits to legislative and executive action within those vague
bounds which are undefined and a priori undefinable."' 47 With
several hundred law suits involving recent congressional acts
pending in the courts and the promise of many more," 8 it is too
much to expect, however, that efforts will cease to be made to
provide some device which will effect an early determination of
constitutionality.
While some observers suggest the creation of a non-partisan
commission of lawyers to advise Congress upon the constitution-
ality of proposed measures, 9 others believe the advisory opin-
ion practice promises the best solution. In some instances, ap-
parently, little consideration has been given to the practical
effects of its use. To many, of course, it is a matter of small
consequence whether the Supreme Court remains a purely
4' Thayer, Legal Essays, pp. 35-41.
147 Social Science Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p. 479.
1 David Lawrence, "The New Deal Day by Day," Columbus Sunday
Dispatch, Dec. 29, 1935.
1"9 Ibid.
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judicial body; is fabricated into some composite arrangement
resembling the Court of Revision which existed in colonial
days;"' or is transformed into an economic council, somewhat
after the fashion of the body proposed by Secretary of Agricul-
ture Henry T. Wallace. 5' A lack of interest here does not seem
the course of wisdom.
The problem requires more than a casual attention. One
may accept the view of Justice Holmes that the United States
will not come to an end if the Supreme Court loses its power to
'" "New York originally not only gave her legislators a share in judicial
power but her judges a share in that of legislation. Her Constitution of 1777
provided for a Council of Revision consisting of the Governor, the Chancellor,
and the judges of the Supreme Court to whom all bills passed by the Senate
and Assembly should be presented for consideration; and that if a majority
of them should deem it improper that any such bill become a law, they should
within ten days return it with their objections to the House in which it orig-
inated, which should enter the objections at large in their minutes, and pro-
ceed to reconsider the bill; and that it should not become a law unless
repassed by a vote of two-thirds of the members of each House. For forty
years this remained a law, and the Council of Revision contained from time
to time judges of great ability, Chancellor Kent being one. During this
period, 6590 bills in all were passed. One hundred and twenty-eight of them
were returned by the Council with their objections, and only seventeen of
these received the two-thirds necessary to re-enact them." Baldwin, The
American Judiciary, p. 30.
In Pennsylvania (Const. of 1776, sec. 47) and Vermont (Const. of 1777,
sec. 44), a Council of Censors was provided for, to be chosen every seven
years. It was to investigate the conduct of affairs and point out, among other
things, all violations of the Constitution by the other departments. In Penn-
sylvania the arrangement lasted from I776 to 1790; in Vermont, from 1777
to 1870.
151 The Wallace Proposal involves setting up a staff of economic counsel-
lors, of perhaps four men, "as revered and trusted" as are those on the Supreme
Court; appointed by the president for terms of nine, eleven, and fifteen years
and given "the power to determine by direct referendum the key policies of
the nation."
The plan would work something like this: The counsellors, whenever
they would see a question of controversial policy that ought to be settled,
instead of letting Congress pass legislation putting it into effect, and then
waiting for the Supreme Court to rule on it, would allow the people to vote
on it, and if two-thirds approve, then it would become a part of the law of
the land which the Supreme Court could not alter.
Secretary Wallace asserts that at present about seven years ordinarily are
required to amend the Constitution. He looks upon this as too long a time.
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declare acts of Congress void" 2 and still find little benefit in
adding further complications to the delicate and difficult task
now imposed upon the Supreme Court in dealing with questions
of constitutionality. Although British constitutional develop-
ment has demonstrated that many strange contrivances can be
added, here, there, or the other place, in adapting political insti-
tutions to changing conditions, it would not seem that the intro-
duction of the advisory opinion practice into our national system
would serve a very useful purpose in solving any "present dis-
contents" in the constitutional field.
152 "I do not think the United States would come to an end if we (the
Supreme Court) lost our power to declare an act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperiled if we would not make the declaration as to the
laws of the several States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy
prevails with those who are not trained to national views and how often action
so taken embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant to end." "Speech
before the Harvard Law School Association of New York," Feb. 15, 1913,
Collected Legal Papers, pp. 295-296.
